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RECENT DECISIONS
UNFAIR COMPETITION - PUBLIC WILL BE PROTECTED
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF HAS NO STANDING IN COURT
Razors manufactured for plaintiff were pledged with plaintiff's written
consent to secure a loan from General Factors. When the loan was not repaid
General Factors sold the razors to defendant, who put them on the market.
Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that- defendant was selling defective razors
bearing plaintiff's trade-mark without the customary one-year guarantee, in
violation of plaintiff's fair trade rights. On appeal from summary judgment
for defendant, Held: plaintiff's consent was a complete waiver of its rights,
and the summary judgment was properly granted, as no issue of fact was
presented. However, while plaintiff had no standing in court, the court itself
had inherent power to protect the public from deceptive practices in commerce.
Accordingly, the decree was modified to prohibit defendant from offering the
razors to the public without indicating to prospective purchasers that the razors
were defective and not guaranteed. Stably, Inc. v. M. H. Jacobs Co., 183 F.
2d 914 (7th.Cir. 1950), cert. denied 95 L. Ed. 146.
Originally, the idea of unfair competition was that if A established a market and a reputation for his goods, B, his competitor, could not interfere with
A's business by inducing the public to buy B's goods in the mistaken belief
that they were buying the goods of A. A's action, if successful, protected his
market and his reputation. At the same time it protected that part of the public
who were buying the goods in reliance upon the quality and standards established by A. Modem business conditions have led the courts to introduce
refinements and subtleties, with increasing emphasis in some of the opinions
upon the right of the public to be protected and the determination of the courts
to furnish such protection. See Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents,26 F. 2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
One class of cases involves the situation where plaintiff introduces a new
product and highly publicizes the name applied to it. After expiration of
plaintiff's patents defendant also enters the field. Whether defendant can use
the name publicized by plaintiff depends upon whether plaintiff has caused
the public to associate that name with a certain type of product, or with a certain manufacturer, i.e., plaintiff. For example, does "cellophane" suggest to
the public just a transparent plastic material, or the DuPont brand of such
material? See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. 2d 75
(2d Cir. 1936); Bayer v. United Drug, 272 Fed. 505 (S. D. NjY. 1921). In
both of these cases the courts held the names to be generic terms associated
by the public only with the products, not with any particular manufacturers;
yet to avoid any possibility of confusion the defendants were forbidden to use
the names without qualification.
Another group of cases involves parties who are not competing, but who
use the same trade name on their products. In Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney
& Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), a company marketing maple syrup using
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the name "Aunt Jemima" was held guilty of unfair competition in a suit by
the makers of Aunt Jemima pancake flour. See also Stork Restaurant, Inc. v.
Stahati, 166 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 194); Horlick's Malted Milk Corp. v. Horlick,
143 F. 2d 32 (7th Cir. 1944) ;RosenbergBros. & Co.v. Elliott, 7 F. 2d 962 (3d
Cir. 1925). In these cases the courts denied the defendants' rights to use
certain trade names because the public tends to rely on well-known trade names
even when used on very different goods than those with which the names are
commonly associated, and because use in connection with such goods if they
were inferior, would tend to impair public confidence in the trade name itself.
Then there are a large number of cases involving the repair or repackaging, by one firm, of goods originally produced by another, in which the original
producer has sought to prevent use of his name or trademark in connection
with the sale of the repaired or repackaged goods. For example, in Prestonettes,
Inc. v. Coty, 264 U. S. 359 (1924), defendant was compelled to inform the
public by appropriate labels that its product, Zlthough originally made by Coty,
had been repackaged by defendant. This was said to b0 for the protection of
purchasers, but of course it was also a concession to the demands of Coty that
it not be held responsible by the public for any inferiority in the product as
marketed by the defendant., See also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders,
331 U. S. 125 (1947); Bayer Co. v. Shoyer, 27 F. Supp. 633 (E. D. Pa. 1939);
Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite, 264 Fed. 810 (6th Cir. 1920) ; Genetral Electric Co. v. Re-New Lamp Co., 121 Fed. 164 (D. Mass. 1903), 128
Fed 154 (D. Mass. 1904); 34 GEo. L. J. 118.
The cases cited by the court in Staly, Inc. v. M. H. Jacobs, the principal
decision, fall within the three groups just discussed. Despite the language
used in some of the opinions, in each of those cases there was a right belonging
to the plaintiff, however tenuous. "Theresult in each case was to afford protection to that right. In the Stahly case, on the other hand, there was no right
in the plaintiff which had not been waived. The cases cited in the Stahly
opinion, therefore, do not support the result reached there.
The decree rendered by the federal court of appeals in the Stahly case
was an exercise of judicial power. The authority of the court to use such power
depends upon Article Ill, Sections 1 and 2, of the United States Constitution.
Section 2 provides that the judicial power shall extend to cases or controversies
under certain specified circumstances. For a case or controversy, there must
be at least two parties having adverse legal interests. Aetna Lifel Insurance
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
If a court may enjoin defendant's practices in a case where the plaintiff
has waived all its rights, there is no reason why a court cannot issue an injunction in a case where the plaintiff never had any rights to begin with,
regardless of waiver. .If the plaintiff in the Stahly case could bring an action
against the defendant resulting in an injunction against that defendant, there
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is no reason why any member of the public could not have brought the action
with the same result. Indeed, if such person could show himself to be a purchaser of razors, likely to be deceived by defendant's practices, he would have
a better ground for bringing the action than the plaintiff had in the Stably
case, since as a .consumer he would at least have some slight interest which
he had not waived. But that interest would probably b- insufficient to support
jurisdiction. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923); Fairchild
v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 (1922). If there is no case or controversy within
the meaning of the Constitution in a situation where the plaintiff has only a
very minute and speculative interest, how, can there be such a case or controversy in a situation where it is determined as a matter of law that the plaintiff
has waived all of his rights, and therefore has no interest whatsoever to support his suit?
Perhaps the cardinal error of the court in the Stahly decision was in exposing itself to criticism unnecessarily. Protection of the public from unfair practices in commerce should not depend upon the coincidental violation of the
private right of someone willing and able to take the matter into court. But
it is not necessary to assert an inherent power in the courts themselves to take
independent action in such cases.
In American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw ManufacturingCo., 103 Fed. 281,
285 (6th Cir. 1900), the court stated: "It is doubtless morally wrong and
improper to impose upon the public by the sale of spurious goods, but this does
not give rise to a private right of action unless the property rights of the plaintiff are thereby invaded. There are many wrongs which can only be righted
through public prosecution, and for which the legislature, and not the courts,
must provide a remedy." See also Ely-Morris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.,
273 U. S. 132 (1925); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403
(1916); Leow's Boston Theatres v. Low, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496 (1924);
1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS (1947 Ed.) 47. It was this
attitude on the part of the courts which led to the establishment of the Federal
Trade Commission, the purpose of which is to protect the public from the
effects of unfair competition in those situations where there is no private
party with interest sufficient to maintain suit. See Federal Trade Commission
v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 27 (1929) ; Royal Baking Powder Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 281 Fed. 744 (2d Cir. 1922).
A similar case may be taken as an example of the way the Stably case
should have been disposed of. In Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt, 235 Fed.
458 (D. N. J. 1913), an unfair competition action was dismissed on the ground
that no invasion of property rights of the plaintiff had been charged. On appeal,
the Circuit Court reversed and sent the case back for further hearing, making
the suggestion that perhaps the case should be referred to the Federal Trade
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Commission. Armstrong Cork Co. v. Ringwalt, 240 Fed. 1022 (3d Cir. 1917).
This was done, and the Commission took appropriate action. Federal Trade
Commission v. Ringwalt Linoleum Works, I F. T. C. 436 (1919).
In conclusion, it appears that the Stahly decision was against the weight
of authority, was based upon questionable theory, and was quite unnecessary,
since there was a statutory remedy created especially for the type of situation
involved.
John L. Goodell

CONFLICT OF LAWS

-

RIGHT TO BRING ACTION

BASED ON A TAX OR REVENUE STATUTE
IN A SISTER STATE
I. The county of Wayne, Michigan, brought an action in the New York
City Municipal Court to collect a personal property tax allegedly due and owing
from the defendant. Defendant's motion for a dismissal of the complaint was
granted on grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action.
The Appellate Term reversed. The Appellate Division reversed the Appellate
Term and reinstated the the judgment of the Municipal Court, holding that
as at matter of policy the New York courts do not lend themselves tothe enforcement of the revenue laws of another state. Wayne County v. American
Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 522 (Ist Dept. Dec. 1950).
II. The State of Ohio brought an action in Kentucky to recover certain
monies owed by the defendant to the Industrial Commission of the State of
Ohio for a workmen's compensation assessment. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, reversing the circuit court, held that whether the action was one to
collect a tax due a sister state or one to enforce a transitory contract claim, the
Kentucky courts would entertain jurisdiction.

Ohio v. Arnett, -

Ky. -,

234

S. W. 2d 722 (Oct. 1950).
These holdings reached by Kentucky and New York reflect the divergent
views among our courts, both state and federal, as to whether or not one state
should permit its courts to be used by another state seeking to enforce a tax
claim. The Supreme Court has held that a judgment is not to be denied full
faith and credit merely because it is for taxes; Milwaukee County v. M. E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) ; but the Court expressly left open the question whether a state is required under full faith and credit -to enforce the tax
claims of another'not yet reduced to judgment.
It has long been a general principle that state laws in and of themselves
have no extraterritorial effect. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S.
430 (1943) ; Mertz v.Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. 2d 597, 108 A. L. R. 1120
(1936) ; but see 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1948). However, states ordinarily enforce
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